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Nanotechnology is concerned with materials and systems whose structures and components exhibit novel physical, chemical, and
biological properties due to their nanoscale size. This paper focuses on what is known as nanomedicine, referring to the applica-
tion of nanotechnology to medicine. We consider the use and potentials of emerging nanoscience techniques in medicine such as
nanosurgery, tissue engineering, and targeted drug delivery, and we discuss the ethical questions that these techniques raise. The
ethicalconsiderationsinvolvedinnanomedicinearerelatedtoriskassessmentingeneral,somatic-cellversusgermline-celltherapy,
the enhancement of human capabilities, research into human embryonic stem cells and the toxicity, uncontrolled function and
self-assembly of nanoparticles. The ethical considerations associated with the application of nanotechnology to medicine have not
been greatly discussed. This paper aims to balance clear ethical discussion and sound science and so provide nanotechnologists
and biotechnologists with tools to assess ethical problems in nanomedicine.
Copyright © 2006 M. Ebbesen and T. G. Jensen. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
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INTRODUCTION
Signiﬁcant technological advances across multiple scientiﬁc
disciplines continue to be proposed and validated. A revolu-
tion in health care and medical technology looms large on
the horizon on the basis of the discipline of nanotechnology.
Reports and articles often distinguish between nanoscience
and nanotechnology. Nanoscience refers to the fundamental
study of phenomena and the manipulation of matter at the
atomic, molecular, and supramolecular level, where proper-
ties diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those at a larger scale. As such,
nanoscience forms the knowledge base for nanotechnology.
Nanotechnology refers to the design, characterisation, pro-
duction, and application of structures, devices, and systems
that have novel physical, chemical, and biological properties
bycontrollingshapeandsizeatthenanometrescale.Integra-
tion with other length scales will often be important to tech-
nological applications. In this paper we use the term nan-
otechnology as a collective term encompassing the various
branches of both nanoscience and nanotechnology.
Nanotechnology research has progressed rapidly over the
last few years. Nanotechnology has become an interdisci-
plinary science where the disciplines of physics, chemistry,
molecular biology, health sciences, and engineering collabo-
rate, share knowledge, and build up a research culture across
traditional disciplinary boundaries. Funding for nanotech-
nology has increased dramatically and nanotechnology has
become a buzz word and is currently very visible compared
to other ﬁelds of research. The vision of nanotechnology is to
advance broad societal goals, such as improved comprehen-
sion of nature, increased productivity, better health care and
to extend the limits of sustainable development and human
potential [1]. A lot of developments in nanotechnology take
years, but researchers and politicians claim that the process
itself can lead to a new industrial revolution [2].
This paper focuses on the application of nanotechnol-
ogy to medicine, the ﬁeld known as nanomedicine, with
its promise of improved therapy and diagnostics. Present-
day nanomedicine exploits ﬁelds such as nanoscale surgery,
tissue engineering, and certain types of targeted drug de-
livery [3–5]. In this paper we consider the use and poten-
tial of emerging nanoscience techniques in medicine, and
we discuss speciﬁc ethical questions that these techniques
raise. These ethical considerations are related to risk assess-
ment in general, somatic-cell versus germline-cell therapy,
theenhancementofhumancapabilities,researchintohuman2 Journal of Biomedicine and Biotechnology
embryonicstemcells,andthetoxicity, uncontrolledfunction
and self-assembly of nanoparticles and nanosystems.
We will show that even though ethical problems in nano-
medicine may be more complex than ethical problems in
medicine and biotechnology in general, for example the tox-
icity of nanoparticles resulting from their nanoscale size
[6, 7], fundamentally the same general ethical principles are
at stake, such as respect for autonomy, beneﬁcence, non-
maleﬁcence, and justice. These ethical principles have been
used for ethical assessment in biomedicine for years, and
they form part of several diﬀerent ethical theories, including
the bioethical theory of Beauchamp and Childress [8]. This
means that even though nanomedicine raises concrete ethi-
cal issues that are more complex than those raised by existing
technology, a reasonably sound knowledge base has already
been acquired in the ﬁeld of bioethics that can be extended
to nanomedicine.
In the following, we consider the use and potential of
emergingnanosciencetechniquesinmedicine, suchasnano-
surgery, tissue engineering, and targeted drug delivery, and
we discuss speciﬁc ethical questions that these techniques
raise.
SURGERY AT THE NANOSCALE
Traditional surgical instruments such as scissors, clamps,
and so on may be replaced by nanotechniques. Even though
developments in nanotechnology may take years, the jour-
ney towards nanosurgery has begun. Few years ago, robot-
controlled microsurgery emerged, eliminating the minimum
space requirement for manual instrument manipulation and
the limitations of the vision of the human eye [9, 10].
And nanosurgery at the level of individual living cells or
organelles has already been performed [11, 12]. Promis-
ing nanosurgery techniques include the use of AFM with a
nanoneedle and femtosecond laser surgery. In the following,
the status, potential, and ethical implications of these tech-
niques are analysed.
Nanosurgeryusingatomicforcemicroscopy(AFM)
withananoneedle
A Japanese research group [11, 13] has performed analyses
andsurgeryonlivingcellsatnanoscaleresolutionusingAFM
and a modiﬁed AFM probe. AFM is a type of microscopy
in which a probe is scanned across the sample to obtain in-
formation about its surface. The information gathered from
the interaction of probe with the surface can be as simple
as physical topography or as diverse as the physical, mag-
netic, or chemical properties of the material. The general
AFM probe is designed as a 3μmp yr a m i dwi t h∼ 30nm end
radius on the end of a cantilever which bends as the topogra-
phyorotherpropertiesofthesamplechange.Thebendingof
the lever is detected by a laser beam detection system and the
information is transmitted to a computer, which generates a
map of the topography or other properties of interest.
T h ep r o p e r t i e so ft h ec e l ls u r f a c ew e r ei n v e s t i g a t e db y
contacting and indenting the cell surface with an AFM probe
in the shape of an ultrathin nanoneedle. Conventional pyra-
midal AFM tips are ∼ 3μm in length, but since the height of
a plated living cell is 5–10μm, Obataya et al [11, 13]m a d e
nanoneedles that are 6–8μm in length and 200–300nm in
diameter. Obataya et al [11, 13] investigated the mechanical
response during insertion of the nanoneedle in living cells.
The nanoneedle penetrated both the cellular and nuclear
membranes and was accurately inserted in the nucleus. This
newtechniquehasseveraladvantagesoverthetraditionalmi-
croinjection of proteins, peptides, and genetic material into
living cells using microcapillaries. Damage stemming from
the use of microcapillaries due to the shape of the capillaries
andtheinaccuracyofthedisplacementisproblematicinrela-
tion to the manipulation of many cell types. The advantages
oftheAFMsystemaretheaccuracyoftheneedleandthatthe
ultrathin needle does not cause fatal damage to living cells. It
has been suggested that the technique could be used to inves-
tigate cell activity, to induce controlled diﬀerentiation, or to
perform therapy on living cells. But Obataya et al emphasise
that they call the technology nanosurgery or cell surgery. In
this case they are not thinking about direct therapy on an in-
dividual cell. What they call “cell therapy” is therapy involv-
ing the donation of intact and functional cells to a patient.
For example, cell surgery technique could be used to induce
cell diﬀerentiation from stem cells to prepare healthy cells by
manipulation using a nanoneedle.
Femtosecondlasersurgery
Femtosecond near-infrared (NIR) laser pulses can be used
to perform surgery of nanometre-sized structures inside liv-
ingcellsandtissueswithoutcreatingdamage.Theintratissue
nanoprocessingisachievedbythegenerationofhighlightin-
tensity (1012 Wc m −2)b yd i ﬀraction-limited focusing of the
radiation of an NIR (λ = 740 and 800nm) femtosecond laser
on a subfemtolitre volume [12, 14]. The energy delivered by
the laser pulses breaks down chemical bonds at the targeted
site, vaporising the tissue without causing side eﬀects such
as heating of surrounding tissue. The concept “femtosecond
laser”referstothedurationofthelaserpulses,whichisinthe
scale of femtoseconds.
The energy of the short pulses of femtosecond lasers is
so high that instead of destroying the tissue by heat gener-
ation (like standard lasers) the photons vaporise the tissue,
and the result is a clean hole without necrosis of adjacent
tissue [3]. According to K¨ onig [14], the use of femtosecond
laser pulses has the advantages of minimal ablation thresh-
old, low transfer of optical energy into destructive mechani-
cal energy, and the absence of thermal damage to surround-
ing structures compared to the nanosecond pulses used in
conventional microsurgery. K¨ onig [14] performed a mini-
mum cut-size of 110nm into the human chromosome 1 and
was able to perform chromosome dissections within living
cells. And using the femtosecond laser, Tirlapur and K¨ onig
[12] could completely knock out an individual plastid (a cy-
toplasmic organelle in plants bounded by a double mem-
brane that carries its own DNA, eg, chloroplasts) or part of
the organelle without aﬀecting adjacent organelles or the vi-
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useoffemtosecondlasermicroscopesineyesurgeryandneu-
rosurgery, tissue engineering, laser-assisted in vitro fertilisa-
tion (IVF), and gene therapy [12, 14].
Yanik et al [15] used femtosecond laser surgery to cut in-
dividual axons in the roundworm C. elegans, which is about
1mm long as an adult. They showed that these axons func-
tionally regenerate after the surgery.
Riskassessment
Tosumup,thepotentialmedicalapplicationsofnanosurgery
techniques using AFM with a nanoneedle and femtosecond
lasersurgeryarepredictedtoincludecelltherapy,eyesurgery,
and neurosurgery, tissue engineering, laser-assisted IVF, and
gene therapy. However, if these nanosurgery techniques are
going to be used in the future for the treatment of disease
andIVF,oneshouldbalancethepotentialbeneﬁtsandpoten-
tialharmsofthesetechniques.Futuremedicalapplicationsof
nanosurgery techniques require a risk assessment.
According to Beauchamp and Childress the evaluation of
riskinrelationtoprobablebeneﬁtisoftenlabeledrisk-beneﬁt
analysis. They say that the term riskrefers to a possible future
harm, where harm is deﬁned as a setback to interests, par-
ticularly in life, health, and welfare [8]. Statements of risk
are both descriptive and evaluative. They are descriptive in
as much as they state the probability that harmful events
will occur, and they are evaluative in as much as they at-
tach a value to the occurrence or prevention of the events
[8]. Commonly in the ﬁeld of biomedicine, the term beneﬁt
refers to something of positive value, such as life or health.
The risk-beneﬁt relationship may be conceived in terms of
the ratio between the probability and magnitude of an antic-
ipated beneﬁt and the probability and magnitude of an an-
ticipated harm. Use of the terms risk and beneﬁt necessar-
ily involves an evaluation. Values determine both what will
countasharmsandbeneﬁtsandhowmuchweightparticular
harms and beneﬁts will have in the risk-beneﬁt calculation
[8]. The terms harm and beneﬁt, deﬁned as stated above, are
ethically relevant concepts. Ethical obligations or principles
about not inﬂicting harm (nonmaleﬁcence) and promoting
good (beneﬁcence) are generally accepted [8]. The ethical
principles of beneﬁcence and nonmaleﬁcence form part of
several diﬀerent ethical theories. For instance, they are the
foundation of the utilitarian theory, which says that ethically
right actions are those that favour the greatest good for the
greatest number. Another example is the Hippocratic Oath,
whichexpressesanobligationofnonmaleﬁcenceandanobli-
gation of beneﬁcence: “I will use treatment to help the sick
according to my ability and judgment, but I will never use it
to injure or wrong them” [8]. So clearly risk-beneﬁt analysis
is an ethical issue. According to Beauchamp and Childress,
the balancing of the general ethical principles of nonmalef-
icence and beneﬁcence is not symmetrical, since our obli-
gation not to inﬂict evil or harm (nonmaleﬁcence) is more
stringent than our obligation to prevent and remove evil and
harm or to do and promote good (beneﬁcence). Our obli-
gation of beneﬁcence requires taking action (positive steps)
to help prevent harm, remove harm, and promote good,
whereas our obligation of nonmaleﬁcence only requires in-
tentionally refraining from actions that cause harm [8].
In the case of nanosurgery we need to compare the
risk-beneﬁt ratio of nanosurgery techniques with the risk-
beneﬁt ratio of already established microsurgery techniques.
Asdescribedabove,nanosurgerytechniquesusingAFMwith
a nanoneedle have several advantages over traditional mi-
croinjection of proteins, peptides, and genetic material into
living cells using microcapillaries. Damage stemming from
the use of microcapillaries due to the shape of the capillar-
ies and the inaccuracy of the displacement is problematic in
relation to the manipulation of many cell types. The advan-
tages of the AFM system are the accuracy of the needle and
that the ultrathin needle does not cause fatal damage to liv-
ing cells. The use of femtosecond laser pulses has the advan-
tages of minimal ablation threshold, low transfer of optical
energy into destructive mechanical energy, and the absence
of thermal damage to surrounding structures compared to
the nanosecond pulses used in conventional microsurgery.
Thisindicatesthattherisk-beneﬁtratioofnanosurgerytech-
niques is smaller than the risk-beneﬁt ratio of already es-
tablished microsurgery techniques. However, the exact risk-
beneﬁt ratios need to be based on detailed experiments.
Risk and beneﬁt identiﬁcations, estimations, and evalua-
tions are all stages in risk assessment, though, the next step is
risk management, which can be deﬁned as “the set of individ-
ual or institutional responses to the analysis and assessment
of risk, including decisions to reduce or control risks” [8].
While risk-beneﬁt analysis may seem like a technical issue,
in which risks and beneﬁts are deﬁned, quantiﬁed, and com-
pared, the deﬁnition of risk and beneﬁts and the evaluation
of how much risk is acceptable (risk management) is clearly
an ethical issue. For example, risk management in hospitals
includes establishing policies aimed at reducing the risk of
medical malpractice suits [8].
Somaticcelltherapyversusgermlinetherapy
If nanosurgery techniques are to be used for gene therapy
in the future, it is not simply enough to make a general
risk assessment and respect the informed consent of the hu-
man subject. In the case of gene therapy, we need to dif-
ferentiate between somatic gene therapy and gene therapy
on germline cells. By using gene therapy on germline cells
the genetic changes not only aﬀect the individual treated,
but also his/her oﬀspring. Germline therapy is not allowed
in many countries. In 1996 the European Council agreed to
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine—a con-
vention for the protection of Human Rights and the dig-
nity of human beings with regard to the application of bi-
ology and medicine. This convention forbids gene therapy
on germline cells: “an intervention seeking to modify the hu-
man genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diag-
nostics or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to
introduce any modiﬁcation in the genome of any descen-
dant” [16]. As a result, an interesting ethical debate is go-
ing on about the perils and deﬁciencies of the convention.
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for a misleading interpretation of “human rights” as sort of
“natural rights” supposedly independent of any human deci-
s i o na n dg r o u n d e di na l l e g e d l yi m m u t a b l e“ h u m a nn a t u r e . ”
According to Mori and Neri [16] the convention represents
the idea that human rights have to be grounded in God or
natural law, as opposed to being declared as rights by human
beings who assert some normative conclusions based on ra-
tional argument. In this latter sense, human rights are not
immutable and can change when rational arguments compel
us to abandon traditional positions. Mori and Neri [16]b e -
lieve that the approach of the convention is too rigid to gov-
ern a research ﬁeld in rapid evolution; a more ﬂexible and
selective approach is required.
Since the aim of the convention is to further the reali-
sation of human rights, Mori and Neri [16]a s kw h i c hh u -
man right is supposed to be involved and whose interests or
needs this right is designed to protect and guarantee? The
answer is clear: the right refers to “the right to a genetic
inheritance which has not been artiﬁcially interfered with,”
and the right is designed to protect future generations. The
point is, as noted above, that when germline therapy is used,
the genetic changes aﬀect not only the individual treated
but also his/her oﬀspring, so if mistakes occur they are ir-
reversible. An experiment with germline therapy could be
seen as tantamount to a clinical experiment on unconsent-
ing subjects, who are the aﬀected members of future genera-
tions. So one can argue that this procedure is in conﬂict with
the principle of respect for the autonomy of future genera-
tions.
However, Mori and Neri [16] believe that the con-
tent of the interest of future generations should be illumi-
nated. Future generations could, for instance, have an in-
terest in the eradication of disease-causing genes. The fun-
damental question asked here is whether there are situa-
tions where germline genetic manipulation is justiﬁable? For
example, are there cases where the beneﬁcence obtained
by germline therapy is primary and where the principle of
beneﬁcence out-balances the principle of respect for the au-
tonomy of future generations? Wivel and Walters [17]s e e
two possible cases. First, such manipulation may be jus-
tiﬁed when both parents are aﬄicted with a recessive au-
tosomal disorder, so that 100% of their oﬀspring would
be expected to have it. This is an exceptionally rare situa-
tion. More common is the case in which both parents are
heterozygotes for a recessive genetic disorder. These par-
ents have a 75% chance of having a phenotypically nor-
mal child, and screening can be carried out during preg-
nancy, followed by selective abortion if the foetus is found
to be homozygous for the mutant allele. Germline genetic
modiﬁcation is seen as an alternative to screening and se-
lective abortion. Wivel and Walters [17]v i e ws u c hm o n o -
genic deﬁciency diseases as Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, Tay-
Sachs disease, and metachromatic leukodystrophy as can-
didates for this type of genetic therapy. In these cases, the
beneﬁcence obtained by use of germline therapy can be
perceived as primary. But this does not mean that possi-
ble risks and possible irreversible mistakes should not be
considered.
Mori and Neri [16] conclude that human rights should
not be interpreted as imposing on us morally unsustainable
obligations, such as the obligation to abstain from curing
people. In contrast, human rights and hence the convention
should be interpreted so that they are not immutable and
can be changed when rational arguments compel us to aban-
don traditional positions. As anexample, Mori and Neri [16]
mention the prospect of in utero gene therapy for homozy-
gous alfa-thalassemia and adenosine deaminase (ADA) deﬁ-
ciency, where the possibility of inadvertent germline modiﬁ-
cations cannot be deﬁnitely excluded.
Enhancementofhumancapabilitiesbynanosurgery
Until now we have focused on potential medical applica-
tions of nanosurgery. But will surgeons of the future only
use nanosurgery techniques to restore and maintain nor-
mal function? Or will they produce suprahuman capabili-
ties (so-called transhumans)? Satava [18] points out that it
may be possible through surgery at the nanoscale to “pro-
vide “suprahuman” capabilities, such as the ability to see
in the infrared or ultraviolet portion of the spectrum ...
or see in the dark using implanted ultrasound sensors.”
Many writers have sought to draw a sharp line between
gene therapy and enhancement in order to protect thera-
peutic procedures from the moral taint of genetic enhance-
ment,whichisoftenassociatedwitheugenics,“playingGod,”
creating perfect people, and so on. Maintaining this dis-
tinction allows one to acknowledge the negative connota-
tions of genetic modiﬁcations while endorsing the positive
aspects. But the distinction between therapy and enhance-
ment is blurred. One could argue that the goal of therapy
is to treat an existing disease, while the goal of enhance-
ment is to exceed the boundaries of normalcy and health.
But many ordinary medical interventions that are designed
to prevent disease actually enhance normal human function-
ing. For example, vaccinations enhance the immune system
by causing it to produce cells and antibodies thereby in-
creasing its ability to ﬁght diseases. Furthermore, many so-
cially acceptable medical interventions, such as cholesterol-
lowering drugs, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, and hor-
mone replacement therapy, are designed to prevent, fore-
stall, or counteract the normal aging process. One reason
why it is so diﬃcult to deﬁne “genetic enhancement” is that
the concept of “enhancement” is based on some understand-
ing of what constitutes a normal healthy human being [19].
Although scholars continue to use the phrase “genetic en-
hancement,” the reﬂections above indicate that we do not
have a clear idea of what constitutes genetic enhancement
andwhatconstitutesanormalhealthyperson.Buttheredoes
seem to be some kind of consensus among writers that “en-
hancement” refers to improving capacities such as intelli-
gence, longevity, memory, and so on [20–22]. Even though
the discussion of genetic enhancement often has the charac-
ter of science ﬁction without reference to scientiﬁc facts, we
have to take into account that several philosophers, such as
Bostrom [23], are celebrating the prospect of radically im-
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humanity through genetic engineering, while other philoso-
phers, such as Habermas [24], are worried about the con-
sequences of genetic enhancement for our identity and self-
understanding [21].
The future theoretical possibilities for enhancement of
human capabilities give rise to a moral dilemma with re-
gard to the enhancement of oﬀspring: on the one hand,
it seems natural for parents to give their children the best
possible opportunities; on the other hand, their choice of
crucial properties gives parents a power over the lives of
their oﬀspring that might threaten the basic principle of hu-
man freedom. Genetic enhancement would cause the birth
of children whose genetic makeup would have been in-
tentionally designed by other human beings. According to
Habermas [24] this would substantially alter the precondi-
tions of “natural” reproduction, by eliminating the contin-
gency or “chance” aspect of one’s coming into existence to
such a degree that the freedom of the future human being
would be violated. This might deeply alter the moral self-
understanding of the human species and inﬂuence future
generations [21, 22].
So, Habermas [24] operates with a right to an unchanged
geneticmakeup.Butourmainconcerniswhyhumangenetic
makeup or genetic integrity ought to be protected. What is
the special moral status of DNA? In our opinion it is hard
to claim that DNA has a fundamental intrinsic value in it-
selfwithoutfurtherjustiﬁcation.Besides,germlinegenether-
apy should not be singled out as the only factor able to alter
the genetic constitution of future generations. For instance,
medical x-rays on occasion undoubtedly induce mutagenic
changes in patients’ germline [25]. Habermas [24] empha-
sises that the crucial thing about interfering with germline
DNA is the irreversibility of the procedure. The child would
be in a position where he/she cannot say “yes” or “no,” that
is, give informed consent to the procedure. So according
to Habermas genetic enhancement on germline cells among
other things contradicts the principle of respect for auton-
omy.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, Habermas [24]o p -
erates with a so-called “right to chance,” which is violated
if parents intentionally alter the genetic makeup of a future
child. But future parents also intentionally choose their part-
ners for reproduction. So, again our main concern is what
constitutes the special status of DNA.
It should also be noted that important issues of jus-
tice are connected to genetic enhancement [26–28]. For in-
stance, if it is possible to improve normal characteristics
by nanomedicine, who should be oﬀered “the treatment”?
Should it be those who are better oﬀ?O rd ow eh a v eam o r a l
responsibility towards those who are worse oﬀ? In this case,
the principle of just distribution of goods in society is at
stake. But how to distribute health goods and services is a
very complicated issue, not only with regard to the discus-
sion about enhancement of capabilities by nanosurgery, but
in health care in general. This issue is connected to the so-
cietal implications of nanotechnology, such as the prioritis-
ing and commercialisation of science, public trust and trans-
parency in relation to new technologies, and the question of
who should gain from nanotechnology. For instance, do we
have a responsibility for developing countries? [29]. How-
ever, further work on these issues exceeds the scope of this
paper.
TISSUE ENGINEERING
Historically, synthetic materials have not served as adequate
implants. For example, the current average lifetime of an or-
thopaedic implant, such as a hip, knee, ankle, and so on, is
only 15 years. Conventional materials, that is, materials with
constituent dimensions greater than 1 micron, do not in-
voke the proper cellular responses to regenerate tissue that
would allow these devices to be successful for long periods
of time. In contrast, nanophase materials may be a success-
ful alternative, thanks to their ability to mimic the dimen-
sions of the constituent components of natural tissues like
proteins. Nanophase materials are deﬁned as materials with
constituent dimension less than 100nm in at least one di-
mension. Materials investigated to date include nanophase
ceramics, metals, polymers, and composites. Data has also
emerged suggesting that nanophase materials may be op-
timal materials for tissue engineering applications. This is
not only due to their ability to simulate the dimensions
of the proteins that make up tissues, but also because of
their higher reactivity to the protein interactions that control
cell adhesion and, thereby, the ability to regenerate tissues
[30].
Strategies in tissue engineering may be divided into the
following two categories: (1) in vivo tissue engineering by
cell injection and (2) ex vivo tissue engineering by cell ex-
pansion on supporting material. Tissue engineering in vivo
by cell transplantation is typically performed by intravenous
administration of cells in suspension. The vision is that these
cells will engraft in the organ (eg, spleen or liver), prolifer-
ate extensively and reconstitute organ function [31]. If tis-
sues are engineered ex vivo, cells are expanded in vitro on a
supporting material that acts as a template for growth [32].
Autologous cells are preferred as source material for tissue
engineering, since they will not evoke an immunologic re-
sponse. These cells are often found within the organ itself,
isolated, expanded in vitro and transplanted (injected) back
into the patient. Limited cell engraftment and limited cell
survival remain major problems with these techniques [31].
Furthermore,manypatientswithend-stageorgandiseaseare
unable to yield suﬃcient cells for expansion and transplanta-
tion. Since stem cells are pluripotential (they have the ability
to diﬀerentiate into several cell types) and are able to repli-
cateindeﬁnitely,theymaybeanalternatesourceofcellsfrom
which the desired organ can be derived. However, if the stem
cells are allogeneic, their clinical application may be limited
because they can be rejected by the patient’s immune system.
Therapeutic cloning may represent a way of producing cells
which can diﬀerentiate into all cell types and replicate indef-
initely while not being rejected by the immune system. Ther-
apeutic cloning entails the isolation of embryonic stem cells
fromanembryocreatedbytransplantationofanucleusfrom
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expandedstemcellsareperfectlymatchedtothepatient’sim-
mune system. But obtaining, purifying, and expanding stem
cell cultures and the control of permanent diﬀerentiation
processes are issues that still need to be worked out [33, 34].
Many parenchymal cells are anchorage-dependent and
require speciﬁc environments that often include the pres-
ence of a supporting material to act as a template for growth.
Therefore both in vitro expansions of cells for cell injection
and ex vivo tissue engineering need suitable substrates for
adhesion and proliferation. These scaﬀolds require mechani-
cal strength, interconnected channels, and controlled poros-
ity or pore distribution to allow diﬀusion of nutrients to the
transplanted cells [32]. For ex vivo tissue engineering, cells
may be seeded on to polymer matrices, expanded in vitro
and then implanted. Ultimately, the cells become incorpo-
rated into the tissue or organ of implantation as the polymer
biodegrades. The polymer serves as a scaﬀold or a template
to guide cell organisation and growth. Some of the materials
usedasscaﬀoldsaresyntheticpolymers (polymersofglycolic
acid) or natural material such as collagen [34].
Experimental eﬀorts are currently underway for tissue
engineering involving virtually every type of tissue and ev-
ery organ of the human body. Various tissues are at diﬀer-
ent stages of development [33]. For instance, in the ﬁeld of
liver therapies, hepatocytes have been incorporated into bio-
compatible support materials to make an implantable device
which has been tested in rat models. The biocompatible ma-
terial promotes the cell attachment, survival and function of
the transplanted hepatocytes. Furthermore, initial studies in
animal models have demonstrated the feasibility of the sur-
vivalofdissociatedcellsdeliveredbyveininjectionordirectly
injected into the spleen and liver. However, cell engraftment
and survival are limited [31]. So, at present, cell transplan-
tation and implantable constructs have only limited clinical
use [31, 34, 35]. An ethical analysis of tissue engineering in
general requires a risk analysis as described above in relation
to nanosurgery, and informed consent should be obtained
from both the cell-donor and the participant in the clinical
trial [36]. But the use of embryonic stem cells for tissue en-
gineering and therapeutic cloning also raises some speciﬁc
ethical issues.
Ethicalissuesinembryonicstemcellresearch
The ethical issues in stem cell research depend on the source
of the stem cells. Somatic stem cells originate from the um-
bilical cord or the spinal cord. The use of somatic stem cell
for therapy raises the very same ethical issues as the other
somatic medical interventions we have talked about. These
ethical issues include informed consent (the principle of re-
spect for autonomy), risk analysis (the principles of beneﬁ-
cence and nonmaleﬁcence), and the question of who should
be oﬀered the treatment (the principle of justice). But the
use of embryonic stem cells for tissue engineering and ther-
apeutic cloning also raises some speciﬁc ethical issues. In
most cases, human embryonic stem cell lines are derived
from a culture of a preimplantation embryo produced by
IVF. These are mostly embryos in excess of those required
for reproduction and donated by couples who have under-
gone IVF treatment. These embryos probably have the po-
tential to develop into human beings. It is this developmen-
tal potentiality that marks them out as diﬀerent from other
cellular donations and which lies at the heart of the ethical
sensitivities involved in research into embryonic stem cells
[37].
Themainquestioniswhatstatushumanembryonicstem
cells have compared to new-born children. This problem
arises from the fact that development from embryo (fertil-
isation) to human being is a continuous process. Interpre-
tation of the value of human life is part of a world view.
Some would say that human life has the status of a poten-
tial person from conception, so embryonic stem cells deserve
to be protected from avoidable harm. Since embryonic stem
cells have moral status or dignity, they should not be de-
stroyed in research for the sake of basic science or for the
sake of trying to develop new therapies. But a more liberal
viewwouldbethathumanembryoshaveanimportantmoral
status or dignity only after their biological individuality has
been established and only after the completion of implanta-
tion. On this view, we can defend research into embryonic
stem cells, which oﬀers great promise for basic science in the
short term and may help to provide new approaches to ther-
apy in the long term. An even more liberal view would be
that the circumstances of a human embryo’s creation do not
aﬀect its moral status while it is in vitro, so we can defend
research into embryonic stem cells. As can be seen, the eth-
ical dilemma centres around the fact that embryonic stem
cells are derived from a potentially viable embryo, which
means it centres around the question whether or when this
embryo has a moral status or dignity which should be re-
spected.
The conservative view, which holds that human life
should be protected from conception, that is, the protec-
tion is absolute, is represented in the regulation of research
into embryonic stem cells in the following countries: Ire-
land, Italy, Norway, and Austria. In these countries, research
into embryonic stem cells is not allowed. The liberal view
w h i c hh o l d st h a th u m a nw o r t hm u s tb eg r a d u a t e di na c -
cordance with the development of the foetus, that is protec-
tion of human life is relative, is represented in the regula-
tion of embryonic stem cell research in the following coun-
tries: Belgium, Great Britain, and Sweden. In these coun-
tries research is allowed into embryonic stem cells left over
from IVF and embryonic stem cells derived for research.
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Holland, Spain, and Hungary
represent a middle position; in these countries research is
only allowed into embryonic stem cells left over from IVF
[38].
Given that ethical problems centre around the status
of the embryo, we need to investigate whether there are
ways of getting around the embryo. According to Evans [39]
cells for transplantation therapies, as well as for in vitro
studies, can be isolated from aborted foetuses, and embry-
onic germ cell lines (pluripotential stem cell cultures that
are closely related to embryonic cell lines) can be isolated
from 5–9-week-old foetal gonads. In these cases there is noM. Ebbesen and T. G. Jensen 7
potential for development at the time when the cells are de-
rived.
One large paradox remains, however. Why have ethical
issues in connection with embryonic stem cell research re-
ceivedsomuchattentioncomparedtotheethicsofdiscarded
blastocysts left from IVF? We need to be consistent in these
two cases. If embryonic stem cell research is ethically prob-
lematic because of the moral status of the embryo, then it is
equally problematic to discard blastocysts left over from IVF.
DIAGNOSTICS AND TARGETED DRUG DELIVERY
BY NANOPARTICLES
Future applications of nanotechnology may include the use
of nanosystems or nanoparticles for the detection of early
disease and the delivery of therapeutic agents. The vision is
that nanoparticles may be able to seek out a target within the
body (eg, a cancer cell) and perform treatment. The treat-
ment delivered by the nanoparticles may be that of releasing
a drug in a localised area, thus minimising the potential sys-
temic side eﬀects of generalised drug therapy as in, for in-
stance, chemotherapy [3, 18, 40].
There are numerous engineered constructs, assemblies,
architectures and particulate systems used for diagnostics
and targeted drug delivery, whose unifying feature is their
nanometre-scale size range (from a few to 250nm). These
include polymeric micelles, dendrimers, polymeric and ce-
ramicnanoparticles, proteincagearchitectures,viral-derived
capsid nanoparticles, polyplexes, and liposomes. First, ther-
apeutic and diagnostic agents can be encapsulated, cova-
lently attached, or adsorbed on to nanocarriers. These ap-
proaches can overcome drug solubility issues, particularly
in view of the fact that large numbers of the new drug
candidates emerging from high-throughput drug screening
initiatives are water insoluble. Second, by virtue of their
small size and by functionalising their surface with synthetic
polymers and appropriate ligands, nanoparticulate carriers
can be targeted to speciﬁc cells and locations within the
body after intravenous and subcutaneous routes of injec-
tion. Such approaches may enhance therapeutic eﬀective-
ness and decrease side eﬀects. Some of these carriers can
be engineered in such a way that they can be activated by
changes in the environmental pH, chemical stimuli, or by
the application of an external heat source. Such modiﬁ-
cations oﬀer control over particle integrity, drug delivery
rates, and the location of drug release, for example, within
speciﬁc organelles. Some are being designed with the fo-
cus on multifunctionality; these carriers target cell recep-
tors and deliver simultaneously drugs and biological sensors
[41].
But if nanoparticles are to be used for targeted drug de-
livery, we need to be aware of the toxicity of nanoparticles
resulting from their nanoscale size. Materials in this size-
range may approach the length scale where their properties
diﬀer substantially from those of bulk materials of the same
composition, allowing them to perform exceptional feats of
reactivity, for instance. Possible undesirable results of these
capabilities are harmful interactions with biological systems
and the environment with the potential to generate toxicity
[6, 7]. So we need to perform a risk-beneﬁt analysis as de-
scribed above.
Theprospectsofuncontrolledself-assembly
ofnanosystems
Althoughsomeofthenanosystemsusedindrugdeliverymay
be pre-manufactured, Satava [18, 40] points out that many
may need to be created by self-assembly. The scientiﬁc chal-
lenge will then be to control these self-assembling processes
[18, 40].
In his book, Engines of Creation,D r e x l e r[ 42]d e -
scribes the fear of the uncontrolled spread of self-assembling
nanoparticles. But to evaluate the realisation rate of self-
assembling nanoparticles, we should look at the state of
the art. Current research into the self-assembling of nanos-
tructures deals with the self-assembly of, for instance, car-
bon nanotubes and rodcoil polymers. The idea behind self-
assembly is that molecules always seek the lowest energy
level available to them. If bonding to an adjacent molecule
accomplishes this, they bind. The forces involved in self-
assembly are generally weaker than the bonding forces that
hold molecules together, because they correspond to weaker
aspects of Coulombic interactions and may be compared
to hydrogen bonds that hold the hydrogen atoms in one
molecule of liquid water together with the oxygen atom of
the next [43]. So when we focus on present research into
the self-assembling of carbon nanotubes, there may be a
relatively long journey to the uncontrolled self-assembly of
nanoparticles. That is why we believe that science ﬁction
looms in the background when Drexler [42] describes the
threat of nanotechnology leading to the uncontrolled spread
of self-replicating nanosystems or nanoparticles in environ-
ment.Thiskindofapproachtotheevaluationofnanoscience
techniques should be avoided, so we can have a debate
founded on sound science, where the actually documented
risks of nanotechnology are taken seriously, instead of a de-
bate based on public fear and scepticism caused by predic-
tions spiced with science ﬁction.
Thesigniﬁcance offeedbackmechanisms forcontrolling
thefunctionofnanoparticles
Haberzettl [3] points out that nanoparticles used in drug de-
livery may get “out of control” in the absence of feedback
mechanisms to control their function. To take this into ac-
count, it may be possible to develop nanoparticles which
are biodegradable or composed of naturally occurring sub-
stances which can be eliminated from the body through
the natural mechanisms of metabolism and excretion. Alter-
natively, nanoparticles could have “homing” devices which
wouldallowthemtobecollectedandremovedafterperform-
ing the desired function [3].
If nanoparticles are going to be used in the future for
the detection of early disease and the delivery of therapeu-
tic agents, one ought to balance the risk to nonmaleﬁcence of
the nanoparticles getting “out of control,” the possible benef-
icence obtained by the treatment of serious disease, and the8 Journal of Biomedicine and Biotechnology
question of respect for the autonomy of the patient. The eth-
ical considerations of nonmaleﬁcence, beneﬁcence, and re-
spect for autonomy are in conﬂict and we must consciously
determine which considerations should have most weight.
HOW TO ANALYSE THE ETHICAL ISSUES IN
NANOMEDICINE
As shown when we take potential ethical problems in
nanomedicineasourpointofdeparture,wededucethatgen-
eral ethical principles, such as respect for autonomy, beneﬁ-
cence, nonmaleﬁcence, and justice, are at stake (Table 1).
Theethicalprinciplesatstakeinnanomedicineformpart
of several diﬀerent ethical theories. In our argument, we fol-
low the bioethical theory of Beauchamp and Childress, be-
cause it contains the relevant principles (Table 1). Accord-
ingtoBeauchampandChildress adialecticalrelationship ex-
ists between ethicalprinciples and concreteethical problems.
T h ee m e r g e n c eo fn e we t h i c a lp r o b l e m sp r o v o k e sac r i t i c a l
analysisandpossiblyareformulationofexisting ethicalprin-
ciples. Due to the dialectical relationship, this reformulation
may provoke a modiﬁed view of actual ethical problems. In
thisway,theexaminationofethicalproblemsisaprocessand
not the application of rigid ethical principles [8]. According
toBeauchampandChildress’theorywecanusepracticaleth-
ical problems in nanomedicine as a starting point to analyse
the ethical principles that are at stake in the actual case. This
analysis may lead to a modiﬁcation of the ethical principles
becauseofthedialecticalrelationshipbetweenprinciplesand
practice.
Beauchamp and Childress believe that the principles of
their theory (respect for autonomy, beneﬁcence, nonmalef-
icence, and justice) ﬁnd support across diﬀerent cultures.
They claim that the principles are part of a cross-cultural
common morality [8]. However, even though these princi-
ples are generally acknowledged, this does not mean that
there is consensus about what is good and bad. Interesting
debates occur when the principles are to be interpreted and
balanced in speciﬁc historical, social, economic, and political
contexts. According to Beauchamp and Childress, no princi-
ple ranks higher than the others. Which principles should be
given most weight must depend on the context of the given
situation. Beauchamp and Childress consider the four prin-
ciples as prima facie binding, that is, they must be fulﬁlled
unless they conﬂict on a particular occasion with an equal or
stronger principle. This type of principle is always binding
unless a competing moral obligation overrides or outweighs
it in a particular circumstance. Beauchamp and Childress
w r i t e“ s o m ea c t sa r ea to n c ep r i m af a c i ew r o n ga n dp r i m a
facie right, because two or more norms conﬂict in the cir-
cumstances. Agents must then determine what they ought to
do by ﬁnding an actual or overriding (in contrast to prima
facie) obligation” [8]. This means the agents must locate the
best balance of right and wrong by determining their actual
obligations in such situations by examining the respective
weights of the competing prima facie obligations (the rela-
tiveweightsofallcompetingprimafacienorms).Beauchamp
and Childress write “what agents ought to do is, in the end,
Table 1: A brief formulation of the bioethical principles of respect
for autonomy, beneﬁcence, nonmaleﬁcence, and justice.
The two American bioethicists Tom L. Beauchamp and James
F. Childress:
The Principle of Respect forAutonomy
(i) As a negative obligation: autonomous actions
should not be subjected to controlling constraints by
others.
(ii) As a positive obligation: this principle requires
respectful treatment in disclosing information,
probing for and ensuring understanding and
voluntariness, and fostering autonomous
decision-making.
This principle does not count for persons who are not able to
act autonomously: infants, drug-dependent patients are
examples. However, these persons are protected by the
principles of beneﬁcence and nonmaleﬁcence [8].
The Principle of Beneﬁcence
(i) One ought to prevent and remove evil or harm.
(ii) One ought to do and promote good.
(iii) One ought to weigh and balance the possible
goods against the possible harms of an action [8, 46].
The Principle of Nonmaleﬁcence
One ought not to inﬂict evil or harm. Or more speciﬁcally:
one ought not to hurt other persons mentally or physically
[8].
ThePrincipleof Justice
Beauchamp and Childress examine several philosophical
theories of justice including egalitarian theories which
emphasise “equal access to the goods in life that every rational
person values (often invoking material criteria of need and
equality)” [8]. Beauchamp and Childress propose that
“society recognize an enforceable right to a decent minimum
of health care within a framework for allocation that
incorporates both utilitarian and egalitarian standards” [8].
(Utilitarian theories emphasise “a mixture of criteria for the
purpose of maximising public utility”) [8].
determined by what they ought to do all things considered”
[8].
In the latest edition of their book, Principles of Biomedi-
cal Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress specify conditions that
should be fulﬁlled for one prima facie principle to weigh
heavier than another [8]. They also describe how to spec-
ify the principles [8]. Mepham [44] has developed a practi-
cal way of applying Beauchamp and Childress’ theory called
an “ethical matrix.” This approach describes how to move
from the general level of the principles to the level of prac-
tical questions [45].
We believe then that most of the ethical questions
raised by nanomedicine so far are covered by Beauchamp
and Childress’ principles. An example of the application
of Beauchamp and Childress’ ethical principles as tools forM. Ebbesen and T. G. Jensen 9
analysing ethical issues in nanomedicine could be an ethi-
cal assessment of the use of nanoparticles for the detection
of early disease and the delivery of therapeutic agents. In
this actual case, one has to balance the risks of nonmaleﬁ-
cence caused by the nanoparticles getting “out of control,”
the possible beneﬁcence obtained by the treatment of serious
disease and respect for the autonomy of the patient. Here the
principles of nonmaleﬁcence, beneﬁcence, and respect for
autonomy are in conﬂict, and the agents must consciously
determine which prima facie principles should be set-aside
in the actual situation.
AlthoughBeauchampandChildress’theoryisprominent
in bioethics, it is, of course, also subject to much philosoph-
ical discussion [47–58]. For example, in an attempt to crit-
icise philosophical bioethics in general, Hedgecoe [52]f o -
cuses on the bioethical theory of Beauchamp and Childress,
because principlism is the dominant way of doing bioethics.
Hedgecoe [52] accuses traditional philosophical bioethics of
giving a dominant role to idealised rational thought, and of
tending to exclude social and cultural factors. He criticises
principlism for using abstract universal principles without
empirical evidence and for concentrating on developing and
justifying theories while paying little attention to the prac-
tical utilisation of those theories. Hedgecoe [52]s u m su p
“because of this refusal to come to terms with empirical re-
search in the way in which ethical decision-making actu-
ally takes place in the clinic, bioethics faces a diﬃcult gap
that must be bridged if it is to remain a relevant and seri-
ous discipline.” As an alternative to principlism, Hedgecoe
[52]defendsthepositionofwhatiscalled“criticalbioethics,”
where the results of empirical research feed back to chal-
lenge and even undermine the theoretical framework of
bioethics.
However, we do not think that this critique of Beau-
champ and Childress’ theory is well founded. As pointed
out above, according to Beauchamp and Childress, a dialec-
tical relationship exists between ethical principles and ethical
problems. The emergence of new ethical problems provokes
a critical analysis and possibly a reformulation of the ethical
principles.Duetothedialecticalrelationship,thisreformula-
tion may provoke a modiﬁed view of actual ethical problems
[8]. So the principles of Beauchamp and Childress are not
rigid, but changeable. In his paper, A defense of the common
morality, Beauchamp [59] stresses the importance of empiri-
cal research for ethical principles. And the ﬁrst author at this
paperiscurrentlyindialoguewithBeauchamp,performinga
qualitativeempiricalinvestigationoftheuseofthefourprin-
ciples by molecular biologists and physicians in their daily
work [60], so as to improve the bioethical theory of princi-
ples by bringing it into concord with practice. According to
BeauchampandChildress, thereis nostraightforwardmove-
ment from principles to particular judgments. Principles are
only the starting points and, as such, general guidelines for
the development of norms of appropriate conduct.The prin-
ciples need to be supplemented by paradigm cases of right
action, empirical data, organisational experience, and so on
[8]. Beauchamp and Childress state that rights, virtues, and
emotionalresponsesareasimportantasprinciplesforethical
judgement [8]. So to point at the four principles is by no
means the ﬁnal word about the ethics of nanomedicine.
Given the fact that we cannot know what form nan-
otechnology will take in the future and therefore what
kinds of ethical issues will arise, we are conﬁdent that
the open-endedness of Beauchamp and Childress’ theory
makes it appropriate for discussing emerging ethical issues
in nanomedicine. Due to the dialectical relationship between
theory and practice, the emergence of new ethical problems
in nanotechnology may provoke a reformulation of the eth-
ical theory bringing it into concord with the future prac-
tice of nanotechnology. We are convinced that the open-
ended theory of Beauchamp and Childress is suﬃciently sen-
sitive to the dynamics of the ﬁeld of nanotechnology to ade-
quately address emerging ethical issues in the ﬁeld. The sen-
sitiveness of Beauchamp and Childress’ theory can be illus-
trated by the changes they have made since the ﬁrst edi-
tion of their theory [61]. Beauchamp and Childress have
taken their critics into account over the last 25 years by in-
corporating their comments and suggestions and simulta-
neously publishing papers to discuss their theory [47, 48,
59].
CONCLUSION
In considering the use and potentials of emerging nanosci-
ence techniques in nanomedicine, such as nanosurgery, tis-
sue engineering, and targeted drug delivery, we have dis-
cussed ethical considerations related to this ﬁeld. These eth-
ical considerations are related to risk assessment in general,
therapy on somatic cells versus germline cells, the enhance-
ment of human capabilities, research into human embry-
onic stem cells, and the toxicity, self-assembly and uncon-
trolledfunctionofnanoparticlesandnanosystems.Theanal-
ysis of potential ethical problems in nanomedicine shows
that even though ethical questions in nanomedicine may be
more complex than ethical questions in general medicine
and biotechnology, for example the toxicity of nanoparticles
resulting from their nanoscale size [6, 7], fundamentally the
same general ethical principles, such as respect for auton-
omy, beneﬁcence, nonmaleﬁcence, and justice, are at stake.
These ethical principles have been used for ethical assess-
ment in biomedicine for several years and they form part
of several diﬀerent ethical theories, including the bioethi-
cal theory of Beauchamp and Childress [8]. This shows that
eventhoughnanomedicine raises ethical issuesthataremore
complex than those raised by existing technology, a reason-
ably sound knowledge base has already been acquired in the
ﬁeld of bioethics that can be extended to nanomedicine.
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